Competitive Balance Draft Picks and the Decentivization on Spending for Teams that Need Them

Assessing Competitive Balance Draft Pick Value, and How the System Needs to be Improved

There is, apparently,  an uneven playing field in Major League Baseball that needs balancing, and “new”-ish competitive balance picks in the draft can and/or will improve this.  Instead of basing the decision of which teams receive a balance pick on a team’s record (you know, that thing that actually indicates how well you competed that year against your peers), the picks are doled out via a lottery system to a pool of the ten bottom teams in terms of both market size and revenue (although a team's odds in the lottery, once they're in, is based on their win-loss record from the previous year).  I won’t get into how evidence shows that market size has little to no bearing on how well a team can make and spend money, especially in today’s world of revenue sharing, TV contracts (both local and national), and publicly funded stadiums.  Today’s massive global market is a big factor in every team being able to have a hand in the pot.  But I said I won’t focus on that issue right now.  Rather, I want to discuss whether competitive balance picks (which take place between rounds one and two, and again between three and four) have so far helped to create balance between teams that “can” spend and teams that “can’t”, and what the MLB can be doing better to help stimulate free agent spending league wide.

Back in late May of 2013, MLBTradeRumors writer Charlie Wilmoth wrote a post discussing the value of competitive balance picks, and how their worth may lie in smaller market and low revenue teams dealing away role players for these draft picks, or even having them included in a deal when they trade away a high impact player that they can no longer afford, need, etc.  Since the new collective bargaining agreement in 2012, there have been five deals that included a competitive balance pick changing hands before the July non-waiver trade deadline.  So far, the swaps that have involved balance picks have included both richer teams and poorer teams (based on revenue) being on the receiving end.  St. Louis and Detroit (ranked 5^th and 8^th in MLB in terms of revenue, respectively, per Forbes as of March, 2014) have both received balance picks in trades, the former getting a round B slot and the latter a round A slot.  The others include Houston (twice) and Miami (twice, one of which was a balance pick swap with Detroit).  Pittsburgh has been able to use one of theirs as buyers at the trade deadline, and Oakland got more value out of their round B pick by trading it away to Boston, a club that was looking a little farther past this season to be competitive (and Boston, of course, will probably never qualify to win one of these picks as their market size and revenue are both near the top of all MLB).  

Teams that Don't Get Involved in Big Free Agent Spending Have Even Less Incentive to do so

 

Because these picks appear to hold the value that both the MLB Commissioner’s Office and the clubs eligible for them had hoped, they seem to be working.  So why then, if the teams that are in need of these extra picks actually need them, are they taken away if that team spends money?  If the Colorado Rockies, for example, decide that they want to sign one or more impact players (guys that have received a qualifying offer from their former team), they would lose their 2015 round A competitive balance pick under the current collective bargaining agreement.  Going into the last three games of the season, the Rockies are a lock to have one of the 10 worst records in baseball, and therefore their first round pick is protected should they wish to sign a player that has been extended a QO.  Their round A pick, a mid-30 overall spot in the draft, however, would be forfeited.  What gives?  Are the Rockies suddenly a competitive team based on one signing, and are no longer in need of the handout?  Even if they sign the best free agent on the market this offseason, their team isn’t that drastically different.  So why are they being punished for opening the checkbook?  Their market size will remain the same, unless people begin to move to the Denver metropolitan area in some sort of mass exodus style from wherever they were just to watch Max Scherzer pitch in a Rockies uniform.  Their revenue could increase due to the signing, if the team were able to improve and the market that is there started coming out to more ballgames, but it could just as easily dip because of the $20M a year being eaten up by one player.  

Robinson Cano alone does not a competitive team make

It’s not just the drafted player that a given team would be forfeiting, but that draft slot’s signing bonus money, as well.  Of the $8.3M in draft pool money assigned to the Rockies for the 2014 amateur player draft, over $1.64M of it would have been lost if the Rockies had signed, say, 2^nd basemen Robinson Cano last offseason.  Does the upgrade that Cano offers over the Rockies current man at the keystone, DJ LeMahieu, make them so good that they need to be treated like their big spending rivals, the Los Angeles Dodgers?  The Rockies would be 4.6 wins better than they currently are per Baseball-Reference’s calculation of both players’ WAR, which if rounded up, would make the Rockies 71-87 (and that’s after rounding up).  That makes them as good as the Chicago Cubs currently are.  But a signing like Cano could make them better when they are ready to compete, which could be as early as next season or the year after.  You don't sign a player to a multi-year deal solely as a win now move, but that is in effect the pressure the new collective bargaining agreement has put on small to mid-market teams.

Michael Bourn, 2013

For competitive balance picks to truly create a level playing field, assuming that the current one is uneven, they need to both be correctly doled out to teams in the first place, and they need to be protected.  That protection would need to continue even if they were traded to a big market, high revenue team such as the Yankees or Dodgers, so that the pick would retain its current high trade value.  The last thing that will create balance in the MLB is decentivizing teams that traditionally haven’t spent big on the free agent market from ever wanting to spend big on the free agent market, for fear of the loss of a draft pick and draft pool money.  In the event that a team isn't afraid to spend and forfeit one of those picks, like the Indians did going into 2013 by signing Nick Swisher and Michael Bourn, thereby forfeiting their Round B pick, MLB is effectively telling teams that they need to select their window or even year in which to compete.  Sacrifice a piece of your future for a chance at winning now.  That doesn't seem very balanced, especially compared to the teams that are willing to outspend their mistakes every year like the Yankees and Dodgers.

Photo Credit: Keith Allison (Cano) and Erik Drost (Bourn)

The Boston Athletics: Part Three

Moneyballin’ (’01- ’05)
 

Today we take a look at the guys that helped define what I'm referring to as the "Moneyball" era, due either to their direct impact on the phenomenon that Michael Lewis brought attention to, or just their prominence due to dominant play during that time.

Designated Hitter: Johnny Damon

Damon with the Indians, 2012

I cheated.  So what.  It’s not my fault there’s a glut of great outfielders that have passed through both Oakland and Boston and I wanted to squeeze a fifth one onto the roster (unfortunately for Jose Canseco, he cheated too, and not in the classy way like me… I won’t go ratting out my fellow bloggers when they start consuming excessive amounts of caffeine to power through their articles).  I’m going to go ahead and justify this designated hitter role for Damon by citing his poorer defense compared to this team’s other center fielder, Dave Henderson.  

Damon spent just one season in Oakland, 2001, after coming over in a three team deal that also involved Tampa Bay.  Despite setting up Michael Lewis’s Moneyball’s story well of Damon being a high impact player leaving town for big money… He wasn’t that good with the Athletics.  Sure, his defense was solid that year, as he put up a dWAR of 0.8 from a demanding center field position, but his offense wasn’t anything to write home about.  He hit .256/.324/.363, scoring 108 runs thanks in large part to a lineup consisting of Jason Giambi, Eric Chavez, and Miguel Tejada (all of which drove in more than 110 runs that year).  Damon managed a WAR of 2.4, which per Baseball-Reference’s definition grades out to a slightly above average everyday player (his play in the ALDS may have heightened the mystique, however, as he raked over the 5 game series to the tune of .409/.435/.591).  So maybe losing Damon to the Red Sox that offseason wasn’t as doom and gloom as Michael Lewis and now Hollywood have made it out to be.

Damon was a much better player with Kansas City from ’95 to ’00 than he was in Oakland (hitting .292/.351/.438 and compiling 17.3 WAR), and was again much better once he signed with Boston.  Over the life of his 4 year contract, Damon hit .295/.362/.441, scored 461 times, knocked in 299, and stole 98 bags.  He managed 16.4 WAR, averaging over 4 wins a season.  Of course, Damon will be best known for helping to break “the curse” as one of the idiots in 2004.  He was, for the most part, very quiet in the first 6 games of the series against New York, but came up big with the bases loaded in the 2^nd inning of game 7 with a grand slam.  The homerun largely put the game out of reach early, as the Yankees were then facing a 6 to 0 deficit.  

Although Damon hasn’t officially retired, as he told ESPN as recently as May of 2014, his days of playing are most likely over.  If he never plays again, he will retire 231 hits shy of the 3,000 mark, two World Series rings, 408 stolen bases, and a career WAR of 56.0 over 2,490 games.  

Relief Pitcher: Chad Bradford

Bradford with the Orioles, 2007

Bradford was the pitching poster child for Michael Lewis’s book Moneyball; a pitcher perfectly capable of getting outs, but with the weirdest wrist action, submarine style, and low velocity that made him undesirable to other teams.  Oakland picked him up for the ’01 season by trading future ear-biter-offer Miguel Olivo over to the White Sox, and Bradford became a key piece of the bullpen.  His extreme groundball rates (63.7% of balls put in play against him were on the ground from ’02 to ’09) made him post some solid ERAs throughout his career, finishing at a 3.26 mark.  He spent a lone season in Boston, ’05, where he put up a 3.86 ERA over 23.1IP.  Boston actually traded for Bradford despite the fact that he had undergone lower back surgery in the offseason, and did not become available for play until after the All-Star break.  The trade marked the first time Oakland A’s GM Billy Beane ever swapped players with the Red Sox, but as we’ll see tomorrow, it was just the first of many.  Bradford gets an additional nod for his excellent postseason play; over 23.1IP he posted a miniscule ERA of 0.39, which included trips to the ALDS once with the ChiSox, thrice with Oakland, once with Boston, once with the Mets (and an NLCS), and an AL Pennant winning season with Tampa Bay.  For a guy that couldn’t throw “normal”, he sure was effective.

Middle Infield: Nomar Garciapara

Garciapara teaching kids what a baseball is, 2008

Nomar is easily one of the most eccentric and recognizable players from my childhood.  Growing up near Seattle, kids in Little League would do their best impersanations of a Ken Griffey Jr. batting stance, or hope they’d get jersey number 11 or 3 (to think I was one of those kids, and was excited to get A-Rod’s number now… yuck).  But despite the geographical distance from Shelton, WA, and Boston, MA, imitation of Nomar’s odd behaviorism in the batter’s box is one of my clearest memories; kids adjusting their batting gloves incessantly, followed up by a series of toe taps never got old.  It speaks volumes about Nomar that in an era with Derek Jeter and Alex Rodriguez at the height of their powers, the Boston shortstop was able to stand out.

After earning the Red Sox starting shortstop job from John Valentin in late 1996, Nomar established himself as the best shortstop in the game, a reign that lasted over the course of his Boston career.  From ’97 (the year he took home the ROY) until his last full season with Boston, Nomar compiled a triple slash line of .325/.372/.557, belting 270 doubles, 44 triples, and 169 homeruns.  He was worth 41 WAR over that stretch on the back of his offensive numbers, but dWAR was also a big fan of his work, checking in at 9.2 for those years.  To put things in perspective, the “Captain” over in New York put together a line of .319/.393/.467 with 60 less doubles, 10 less triples, and 52 less long balls.  Jeter’s WAR over those 7 years totaled 37.4, with a negative dWAR of -1.9.  Oh and Nomar played in 136 less games due to his ’01 season being almost completely wiped out due to a wrist injury.  Those seven years marked five All-Star Team selections, the aforementioned ROY award, a Silver Slugger, two batting titles, and five top ten finishes in the MVP voting.  

So had it not been for injuries derailing an extremely promising start to his career, Garciapara would probably be in the Hall of Fame.  Of course, there ain’t no room in the Hall for coulda’ beens.

After injury plagued and less than stellar offensive production with the Cubs and Dodgers from ’04 to ’08, Nomar made his Oakland A’s debut at the age of 35 in 2009.  He played in 65 games, mostly as DH and a first basemen, hitting .281/.314/.388 to go along with 3 homers and 16 runs driven in.  At the end of the year he’d sign a one day contract with Boston to retire a Red Sock. 

Over 1,434 games, Nomar hit .313/.361/.521, and a career postseason line of .321/.386/.589.  If rate stats alone could get you into the Hall, he’d have as good a chance as any.

Check back tomorrow for the fourth and final part of this Boston/Oakland dream team roster construction, when we'll take a look at a group of players still going strong.

Photo Credit: Kieth Allison (Damon, Bradford) and Wally Gobetz (Garciaparra)

The Boston Athletics: Part One

By Jacob Kelly

This year's trade deadline swap of Jon Lester and Yoenis Cespedes got me thinking on all of the great players that have passed through both the Oakland Athletic and Boston Red Sox home clubhouses.  So much so, that I decided to try and construct a semi complete roster of the all-time Oakland/Boston team, with background information on each guy.  Since there are so many players that I wanted to cover, I'm breaking this into a four part series that will carry through the week, as I take a look at each "era" of great players, until finally coming to some time warping amalgamation of a team at the end.

First, here are the rules that I am using to construct this roster:
- The player must have played at least one Major League game for each franchise.
- The player must have played for the Oakland Athletics.  Both Kansas City and Philadelphia are DQ'd here.  Sorry, Lefty Grove.
- Bonus points for having been good for both franchises.
- Bonus points for not having been a jerk.

The roster will include all 8 fielding positions, 3 starting pitchers, 3 bullpen pieces, a designated hitter, and a manager.

With that, here's the first group of the Boston Athletics.

Swappin’ Power for Speed (‘70s- ‘80s)

3^rd Base: Carney Lansford

Lansford played for the Red Sox in ’81 and ’82, posting batting averages above .300 both years and netting himself a Silver Slugger award.  His incredibly high OBPs counter balanced a fairly pedestrian slugging percentage, leading him to OPS .828 and .803 in his years in Beantown.  The following offseason, Lansford was traded to the A’s in a package that included Garry Hancock and minor leaguer Jerry King for Tony Armas and Jeff Newman.  Armas brought a ton of power with him to Boston (slugging .480 over the course of his 4 seasons there, including a 43 HR season), but never the consistency that Lansford gave Oakland in defense or getting on base.  Over parts of 10 seasons with Oakland he would put up a triple slash line of .288/.343/.404 while belting 94 homers and swiping 146 bags, making him one of if not the best 3^rd basemen to ever wear the green and gold.  Arguably, Lansford could just as easily fit in with the next group of guys for the mid '80s to '90s era, but given when he played for Boston, and that they were a couple of great years, his inclusion with this group makes a bit more sense to me.

Outfield: Tony Armas

Armas began his career with the Pirates, playing in just four Major League games with Pittsburgh in ‘76 before coming over to Oakland as part of a 9 player deal the following year.  He quickly established himself as a solid offensive outfielder, mainly playing right, over his six seasons with the A’s (’77-’82).  Armas slashed .250/.286/.434 with Oakland, hitting 111 of his 251 career home runs, earning an All-Star selection in the strike shortened season of ’81, and finishing 4^th in MVP voting that same year.  When he came to Boston in a deal including teammate Jeff Newman for (among others) Carney Lansford, he continued to put up offensive numbers while healthy.  He led the league in RBI (123) and HR (43) in ’84, but finished 4^th in MVP voting despite the offensive production, another All-Star nod and a Silver Slugger.  Leg injuries stalled his output in his Boston years after that, however, and the acquisition of Dave Henderson from Seattle helped dwindle his playing time, particularly in his only postseason trip with Boston.  After regular playing time and mediocre production in the ALCS, Armas got just 1 at bat in the Fall Classic, striking out in the 7^th inning of game 7.  To his credit, Armas was a homerun slugging machine from 1980 to 1985, belting more home runs (187) than any other AL player over that time frame.  

Outfield: Joe Rudi

Rudi made his Major League debut way back in 1967 for the Kansas City Athletics, the year before the team moved out west for the Bay Area.  Rudi was one of the centerpieces of the A’s dynasty, and was a huge force on all three consecutive World Series Champion teams.  From ’68 to ’78 with Oakland he hit .276/.321/.437, played a solid left field (collecting three straight Gold Gloves from ’74-’76), and swatting 111 homers with 521 driven in.  He was a three time All-Star in Oakland, finishing runner up in the AL MVP voting both in ’72 and ’74.  His exit from the Bay Area was a bit less illustrious, however; in 1976, team owner Charlie Finley was attempting to teardown what had been the core of his World Champion teams with the first ever player class of free agency impending.  After being unable to, as Finley claimed, trade or sign players such as Vida Blue, Rollie Fingers, and Rudi, he attempted to sell them.  Rudi and Fingers were to be sold to the Red Sox for $1M each, but MLB Commissioner Charles O. Finley and newly appointed Executive Director of the MLB Players Association Marvin Miller put the kibosh on Finley’s plans.  Rudi would sign with the California Angels that offseason, but struggle to play regularly due to injury.  The left fielder (and by ’81 DH and 1^st basemen) was apparently intent on getting into a Boston uniform someday though, as he was traded to the Red Sox by the Angels in January of ’81.  He got into limited action with the Sox in his lone season with the club, playing in just 49 games and slashing an anemic .180/.239/.352.

Catcher: Jeff Newman

The player pool for catchers in this little experiment isn’t very deep, and Newman gets the nod here based more on his one decent season with Oakland than anything else.  In 1979 Newman would make his first and only all-star team, when he belted 16 homers to go along with a line of .228/.258/.410 leading up to the break.  He’d end the ’79 season with 22 long balls and a line of .231/.267/.399, a season that across MLB had seen more homers than any other year up to that point than 1977 (3,644 were hit in ’77, while 3,433 balls found the seats in ’79, the two highest totals ever up to that point).  Newman would slug 15 the next year, but largely fell into a backup/split role with Mike Heath in ’81, and by the ’82 offseason he was traded to Boston, where his playing time further diminished.  In two seasons with the Red Sox he hit just .200/.262/.292 with 4 HR over 83 games.  He gets bonus points for helping make the trade involving Carney Lansford and Tony Armas possible, allowing for this strange mutant of a team.

Tomorrow we'll take a look at the mid '80s to '90s players.  Feel free to sound off in the comments below if I've missed one of the great Boston Athletics from this era.

Photo credit: StephenGllmer (Fenway Park) and Bay Area Bias (O.Co Coliseum)